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Fiscal Policy and the Labour Market: 
The Effects of Public Sector Employment and Wages
* 
 
I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search and matching frictions and 
two sectors in order to study the labour market effects of public sector employment and 
wages. Public sector wages plays an important role in achieving the efficient allocation. High 
wages induce too many unemployed to queue for public sector jobs, while if they are low, the 
government faces recruitment problems. The optimal steady-state wage premium depends 
mainly on the labour market friction parameters. In response to technology shocks, it is 
optimal to have procyclical public sector wages. Deviations from the optimal policy can 
increase the volatility of unemployment significantly. Public sector wage and employment 
shocks have mixed effects on unemployment. A wage shock raises the unemployment rate, 
while a reduction in the separations lowers it. Hiring more people can increase or decrease 
the unemployment rate. All shocks raise the wage and crowd out employment in the private 
sector. In the empirical part, I employ Bayesian methods to estimate the parameters of the 
model for the United States. I find that the direct search mechanism between the two sectors 
is an important element to explain business cycle fluctuations of the labour market variables. 
 
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Public sector employment is a sizable element of the labour market, but the wage setting 
process is different from the private sector. In this paper I discuss the role of public sector 
wages. If the government offers very high wages to its workers it induces too many 
unemployed to queue for public sector jobs, raising unemployment. If the wages are very low, 
the government faces recruitment problems. Because government jobs tend to be more 
secure than private sector jobs it is optimal to have lower wages in the public sector. Over the 
business cycle it is optimal to have procyclical public sector wages. In other words, public 
sector wages should follow closely the wages in the private sector. Deviations from the 
optimal policy can increase the volatility of unemployment significantly. 
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If you seek advice from a macroeconomist on how to model government consumption, you
are likely to hear: government consumption should be modelled as goods bought from the
private sector.1 However, the main component of government consumption is compensation
to employees. As shown in Table 1, in most OECD countries the public sector wage bill
represents between 50 to 60 percent of government consumption expenditures. Government
employment is an important aspect of scal policy, but it is also a sizable element of the
labour market. In OECD economies, between 10 to 30 percent of all employees are working
in the public sector. Given its relevance, it seems plausible that part of the transmission
mechanism of scal policy occurs through the labour market.
The level of employment and wages in the public sector are relevant, not just because
of their weight in the economy or in the government budget, but also because they play
an important role over the business cycle. Since 2004, the Internet search engine Google
releases a weekly index of keyword searches. Figure 1 shows the growth rate of keyword
searches of \Jobs" and \Government jobs" for the United States, relative to the previous
year. From August 2008, as the recession worsened, the number of searches for jobs has
increased dramatically, but it is clear that since February 2009, people are turning more
towards government jobs. The dierence between the growth rates is around 20 percentage
points. Repeating the exercise for the United Kingdom gives a similar picture. Indeed, the
change in the searching patterns of the unemployed has gained such proportions that it has
been noticed by the press. The following quote is particularly insightful regarding its causes:
Wall Street may be losing its luster for new U.S. college graduates who are
increasingly looking to the government for jobs that enrich their social conscience,
if not their wallet. In the boom years, New York's nancial center lured many of
the brightest young stars with the promise of high salaries and bonuses. But the
nancial crisis has tainted the image of big banks, and with fewer nancial jobs
available, Uncle Sam may be reaping the benet. (Reuters, 11th of June 2009)
The quote hints that in the current recession more people are searching for public sector
jobs for two reasons. First, as the wages in the private sector have fallen, more people are
1At least this is the approach taken by most articles that study the aggregate eects of government
spending. Barro (1990) studies the eects of productive and unproductive spending in an endogenous growth
model. Baxter and King (1993) examine their eects in a Neo-Classical setting, Linnemann and Schabert
(2003) extends it to the New Keynesian model and Gal , L opez-Salido, and Vall es (2007) introduces rule of
thumb agents. All these papers share the feature of considering government spending as goods bought from
the private sector.
2Table 1: Public sector and the labour market
Public wage bill Public Employment Unemployment Correlation
(% gov. consumption) (% total employment) rate (ut;l
g
t)
Australia 52:2% 14:1% 6:3% 0:51
Austria 53:4% 13:1% 4:7% 0:34
Belgium 53:8% 17:9% 6:9% 0:91
Canada 59:8% 20:5% 6:8% 0:55
Denmark 67:8% 30:5% 4:4% 0:78
Finland 63:2% 24:8% 9:9% 0:76
France 58:4% 22:5% 9:4% 0:95
Germany 41:5% 11:6% 7:5% 0:82
Iceland 60:0% 19:0% 2:3% 0:74
Ireland 57:0% 12:7% 4:3% 0:84
Italy 55:6% 16:9% 10:7%  0:40
Japan 37:7% 8:4% 4:7% 0:35
Luxembourg 49:1% 15:0% 2:6% 0:88
Netherlands 42:2% 10:9% 2:6% 0:80
Norway 63:1% 33:6% 3:4% 0:82
Portugal 72:8% 14:3% 4:0% 0:22
Spain 59:2% 14:1% 11:4% 0:13
Sweden 59:2% 31:1% 4:7% 0:33
United Kingdom 53:3% 18:0% 5:5% 0:19
United States 66:5% 15:2% 4:1% 0:66
Average 56:3% 18:2% 5:9% 0:49
Note: Public wage bill, public employment and unemployment rate refer to the year 2000. The correlation
between public sector employment and the unemployment rate is computed from quarterly data (1970 to
2007). Source: OECD.











































Note: The growth rate of the four-weeks average index of keyword searches, relative the same four weeks in
the previous year.
3turning to the public sector where the wages are insulated from the market forces. Second,
there are less jobs available in the private sector relative to the public sector. Indeed, as
shown in the fourth column of Table 1, in all but one country, public sector employment
goes up during recessions. These two facts suggest that government employment and wages
are important elements in explaining the business cycle uctuations of unemployment.
Compared to the theoretical research that focusses on government spending as buying
part of the production of the economy, the literature that studies the eects of public sector
employment and wages is scarce. Finn (1998) nds that in an RBC model with a perfectly
competitive labour market, contrary to government purchases of goods and services, the
purchase of hours reduces output, employment and investment in the private sector. Cavallo
(2005) extends the model to include capital adjustment cost and exogenous growth in tech-
nology and Pappa (2009) to allow for nominal rigidities. Both conclude that private sector
hours and output go down and real wages go up after an increase in government hours.
Ardagna (2007) study the issue in a dynamic general equilibrium model with a unionised
labour market. In her setting, an increase in public sector employment, wages or unemploy-
ment benets, raises the wage in the private sector and thus unemployment. Algan, Cahuc,
and Zylberberg (2002) in a partial equilibrium version nd that, if public sector wages are
low, an increase in public sector employment can reduce unemployment.
Looking at this issue in a frictionless labour market framework might be a useful starting
point, but as Figure 1 shows clearly, to fully understand the transmission mechanisms of scal
policy through the labour market it is crucial to model the existing search and matching
frictions. There have been some attempts to do it. According to Holmlund and Linden
(1993), an increase in public employment has a direct negative eect in unemployment but
crowds out private employment due to an increase in wages. But, for all realistic calibrations,
the direct eect of reducing unemployment is stronger than the indirect eect through wages.
Quadrini and Trigari (2007) examine the impact of public sector employment on business
cycle volatility and nd that the presence of the public sector increases the volatility of
both private and total employment. H orner, Ngai, and Olivetti (2007) study the eect
of turbulence on unemployment when the wages in the public sector are insulated. They
conclude that an increase in turbulence induces more unemployed, who are risk averse, to
search for jobs in public companies, resulting in higher aggregate unemployment than if the
companies were privately managed.
The aim of this work is to provide a comprehensive, yet simple, framework to study the
macroeconomic eects of public sector employment and wages, and their role over the busi-
ness cycle. I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search and matching
4frictions along the lines of Pissarides (2000) with both public and private sectors. The model
shares several features with Quadrini and Trigari (2007). One of its main diculties is the
calibration of the friction parameters in the public sector. In order to do it accurately, I
explore information from several sources from the United States and the United Kingdom.
In a rst stage, I solve the social planner's problem to nd the constrained ecient
allocation. I then solve the decentralized equilibrium and determine the public sector wage
consistent with the optimal steady-state allocation. The optimal wage premium depends
mainly on the dierences of the labour market frictions parameters of the public sector
relative to the private sector. For the chosen calibration, the optimal wage is 3 percent
lower than in the private sector. If the government sets a higher wage, it induces too many
unemployed to queue for public sector jobs and raises private sector wages, thus reducing
private sector job creation and increasing unemployment. Conversely, if it sets a lower wage,
few unemployed want a public sector job and the government faces recruitment problems.
I also examine the properties of the model when subject to technology shocks. The
optimal government policy consists of a countercyclical vacancy posting and a procyclical
wage. If the public sector wages are acyclical, in recessions they become more attractive
relative to the wages in the private sector, inducing more unemployed to queue for public
sector jobs. This further dampens job creation in the private sector and amplies the business
cycle. Deviations from the optimal policy can entail signicant welfare losses. If, for instance,
the public sector wage does not respond to the cycle, unemployment volatility doubles relative
to the scenario under optimal policy.
The model allows us to disaggregate scal shocks into wage and employment shocks
and the latter into separation and hiring shocks. The response to the three shocks varies.
Paying more to public sector workers raises unemployment through two channels. On the
one hand, more unemployed direct their search towards the public sector. On the other
hand, as it increases the value of unemployment, it spills over to private sector wages. These
two channels are also in place under a separation or hiring shock, but they are oset by the
direct eect of increasing public sector employment. In general, reducing separations always
lowers unemployment, but increasing hiring can have opposite eects on unemployment,
depending on the steady-state level of public sector wages. If the wages are high, when the
government opens new vacancies it induces many more unemployed to search for these new
jobs, enhancing the crowding out eect in the private sector and raising unemployment.
The opposite eects of the dierent components of scal policy is one of the key results
of the paper. The extensive empirical literature that evaluates the macroeconomic eects
5of government spending tends to nd mixed eects on private consumption, real wage or
private employment.2 As a consequence, the center of the debate has been on the techni-
cal methodology, particularly on the identication of scal shocks. I argue that the mixed
evidence might be more related to the data, rather than the methodological strategy used.
Fiscal shocks can have distinct eects depending on the type of expenditure we are consider-
ing: employment, wages, purchases of privately produced goods or government investment.
By including all components together, some in particular or using dierent samples in which
the composition of spending has changed, we cannot expect to identify properly one type of
scal shock. This hypothesis is consistent with evidence from Caldara and Kamps (2008)
who, using the same variables and sample, conclude that alternative identication strategies
yield similar results.
The argument that the various types of spending can have mixed macroeconomic eects is
not new. In their seminal paper, Baxter and King (1993) nd that government investment has
dierent quantitative and qualitative eects than government consumption because it aects
the marginal productivity of factors. As mentioned above, Finn (1998) nd that, contrary
to government purchases of goods and services, an increase in government hours reduces
output, employment and investment in the private sector. I show that if we disaggregate
employment compensation into employment and into per-employee wage, they can have
opposite eects on unemployment. To strengthen my argument, I do a simple extension to
the model, replacing public sector employment with services bought directly from the private
sector. In such an economy, increases in the government purchase of goods lowers the wage
and raises employment in the private sector, contrary to shocks in employment and wages.
Some of the model's results are driven by the assumption that the unemployed direct
their search towards the private or the public sector. The purpose of the rest of the paper
is to argue that this is a relevant mechanism. First, I review the evidence from microe-
conometric studies on public sector wages that suggest that individuals self-select into the
private or public sector based on the expected wage dierential. Then, I employ Bayesian
methods to estimate the parameters of the model for the United States, between 1948 and
2007, using quarterly data on: government employment and wages, private sector wages,
unemployment rate, job-separation and job-nding rates. I nd evidence that the share of
unemployed searching for public sector jobs uctuates over the business cycle. Additionally,
the government follows a countercyclical vacancy and a slightly procyclical wage policy.
2See Caldara and Kamps (2008) for an overview.
62 Model
2.1 General setting
The model is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with public and private sectors.
The only rigidities present in the model are due to search and matching frictions. Public
sector variables are denoted by the superscript g while private sector variables are denoted
by p. Time is denoted by t = 0;1;2;::.
The labour force consists of many individuals j 2 [0, 1]. Part of them are unemployed
(ut), while the remaining are working either in the public (l
g







t + ut: (1)
Total employment is denoted by lt. The presence of search and matching frictions in the
labour market prevents some unemployed from nding jobs. The evolution of employment




t and on the separations.
In each period, jobs are destroyed at constant fraction i, potentially dierent across sectors.
l
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t; i = p;g: (2)












; i = p;g: (3)
I assume the unemployed choose which sector they want to search in, so ui
t represents
the number of unemployed searching in sector i. The vacancies in each sector are denoted
by vi
t. The parameter i is the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment and i the
matching eciency. An important part of the analysis focuses on the behaviour of the share





From the matching functions we can dene the probabilities of vacancies being lled qi
t,
the job-nding rates conditional on searching in a particular sector pi























; i = p;g:
The assumption of directed search implies that the number of vacancies posted in one
sector only aects contemporarily the probability of lling a vacancy in the other sector
through the endogenous reaction of st.
72.2 Households
In the presence of unemployment risk we would observe consumption dierences across dif-
ferent individuals. Following Merz (1995), I assume all the income of the members is pooled
so the private consumption is equalised across members. The household is innitely-lived
and has preferences over private consumption goods, ct, and public goods gt. It also has





t[u(ct;gt) + (ut)]; (4)
where  2 (0, 1) is the discount factor. The budget constraint in period t is given by:








t + t; (5)
where rt 1 is the real interest rate from period t   1 to t and Bt 1 are the holdings of one
period bonds. wi
tli
t is the total wage income from the members working in sector i. Finally,
t encompasses the lump sum taxes that nance the government's wage bill and possible
transfers from the private sector rms. I assume there are no unemployment benets.
The household chooses ct to maximize the expected utility subject to the sequence of
budget constraints, taking the public goods as given. The solution is the Euler equation:
uc(ct;gt) = (1 + rt)Et[uc(ct+1;gt+1)]: (6)
2.3 Workers
The value of each member to the household depends on their current state. The value of









iUt+1]; i = p;g; (7)
where t;t+k = k uc(ct+k;gt+k)
uc(ct;gt) is the stochastic discount factor. The value of being employed
in a sector depends on the current wage, as well as, the continuation value of the job that
depends on the separation probability. Under the assumption of directed search, the un-











t+1 + (1   p
i
t)Ut+1]; i = p;g: (8)
8Beside the marginal utility from unemployment, the value of being unemployed and
searching in a particular sector, depends on the probabilities of nding a job and the value
of working in that sector. Optimality implies that there are movements between the two






t = Ut: (9)
















which implicitly denes st. An increase in the value of being employed in the public sector,
driven either by an increase in the wage or by a decrease in the separation rate, raises st, until
there is no extra gain from searching in that sector. Under the directed search assumption
the public sector wage plays a key role in determining st. If the search was random between
sectors, the public sector wage would not aect any variable of the model.
2.4 Private sector rms
The representative rm hires labour to produce the private consumption goods. The pro-
duction function is linear in labour, but part of the resources produced have to be used to











At time t, the level of employment is predetermined and the rm can only control the
number of vacancies it posts. The value of opening a vacancy is given by:
Vt = Ett;t+1[q
p









t + Ett;t+1[(1   
p)Jt+1]: (13)
Free entry guarantees that the value of posting a vacancy is zero (Vt = 0), so we can
















9The condition states that the expected cost of hiring a worker must equal its expected
return. The benet of hiring an extra worker is the discounted value of the expected dierence
between its marginal productivity and its wage, plus the continuation value, knowing that
with a probability p the match is destroyed.
Finally, I consider the private sector wage is the outcome of a Nash bargaining between
workers and rms. The sharing rule is given by:
(1   b)(W
p
t   Ut) = bJt: (15)
2.5 Government
The government produces its goods using a linear technology on labour. As in the private















The numeraire of this economy is the private consumption good. As the public good is
not sold, it has no actual price. However, there is an implicit relative price given by the
marginal rate of substitution. The formulation of the production function (16) implies that
the cost of recruiting is given in units of the public good. Alternatively, if the cost was
included in the budget constraint it would be expressed in units of private consumption.






I assume it sets the wage one period in advance, at the time it posts the vacancies. As st is
determined based on the expected future wages in the two sectors, the current public sector
wage does not aect any variable in the model. There is no time inconsistency problem
because, as taxes are lump sum, the government does not gain from setting a current wage
dierent than promised. Throughout the paper I contrast two types of policies: exogenous
policies to help us understand the functioning of the model and the transmission mechanisms
of scal policy and the optimal policy - the one arising from the social planner's problem.
102.6 Decentralised equilibrium
Denition 1 A decentralised equilibrium is a sequence of prices frt;w
p
tg1
t=o such that, given





t=o, the household chooses a se-
quence of consumption fctg1
t=o, and the fraction of unemployed members searching in the
public sector st and rms choose private sector vacancies v
p
t, such that: (i) the household
maximises its lifetime utility; (ii) the share of unemployed searching in the public sector is
such that the values of searching in the two sectors equalise (equation 10); (iii) private sector
vacancies satisfy the free entry condition (14); (iv) the private wage w
p
t solves the bargaining
condition (15); (v) the private goods market clears: ct = yt; and (vi) the lump sum taxes t
are chosen to balance the government budget (equation 17).
2.7 Social planner's solution
As a benchmark for analysis, I consider the constrained ecient solution. The social planner's
problem is to maximize the consumers lifetime utility (4) subject to the labour market and






























































(1   p)(1   st)
: (20)
Conditions (18) and (19) describe the optimal private and public sector vacancies. On
the left hand side we have the expected cost of hiring an extra worker. The right hand side
gives us the marginal social benet of hiring an additional worker. It consists of its expected
marginal productivity minus the utility cost of working, weighted by the matching elasticity
with respect to vacancies, plus the continuation value. The last element that enters with
a negative sign reects the fact that hiring an additional worker makes it harder for both
sectors to recruit a worker in the future.
The optimal split of the unemployed between sectors, pinned down in (20), depends on
the marginal utility of consumption of both goods, on the number of vacancies and their
cost, and on the matching elasticity with respect to unemployment in both sectors.
113 Calibration
To solve the model, I assume a CES utility function in logs, which allows us to address









t ]; (ut) = ut:
The model is calibrated to match the US economy at a quarterly frequency. The rst
graph in Figure 2 shows the government employment in the United States since 1940. Under
the baseline calibration, the steady-state vacancies in the public sector are such that public
sector employment corresponds to the sample average i.e. 16 percent of total employment.
The second graph shows the monthly separation rate for the two sectors, taken from the
Job Opening and Labour Turnover Survey (JOLTS). The separation rate in the private sector
is almost 3 times higher than in the government: 4.3 against 1.5 percent. The last graph plots
the new hires of each sector as a share on the total unemployed, a proxy for the job-nding
rate. The probability of nding a job in the government sector is only 4.5 percent compared
with 62.5 percent in the private sector. To retrieve the quarterly separation rate, I rst
calculate the aggregate monthly separation rate (0.038) and job-nding rate (0.67). I then
compute the quarterly transition probabilities, allowing for multiple transitions within the
quarter.3 I nd that an employed person has a 5.3 percent probability of being unemployed
in the following quarter. I x the separation rate in the private and public sectors at 0.06
and 0.03. These values imply an aggregate separation rate close to 0.053 while preserving
the dierence between the two sectors.4
To estimate the matching elasticity with respect to vacancies, I regress for each sector
the log of the job-nding rate (the ratio between hires in that sector and unemployment)
on the log of tightness (the ratio between job openings in that sector and unemployment).
The estimated coecients are 0.63 for the private sector and 0.79 for the public sector which
suggest that vacancies are more important determinants of matches in the public sector.5 I
3I compute these probabilities using the following formulas:
q = (m)(fm)(m) + (m)(1   fm)(1   fm) + (1   m)(1   m)(m) + (1   m)(m)(1   fm),
fq = (fm)(m)(fm) + (fm)(1   m)(1   m) + (1   fm)(1   fm)(fm) + (1   fm)(fm)(1   m).
4In the United Kingdom, close to 22 percent of total employment is government employment. As in the
United States, the turnover is higher in the private sector. Each quarter, workers are 3 times more likely to
lose their jobs (1.6 against 0.6 percent), but the unemployed are seven times more likely to nd one there
(23.6 against 3.4 percent). See Gomes (2009) for a detailed study on UK labour market ows.
5Strictly speaking, these regressions are only correct if the share of unemployed searching in the public
sector is constant. However, in Section 8 I estimate the structural model and nd similar values.














1950m1 1960m1 1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
Year





























Note: The government employment series is taken from the Current Employment Statistics survey (Bureau
of Labor Statistics). The grey bars indicate the NBER recession dates. The job-separation and job-nding
rates are calculated from the Job Opening and Labour Turnover Survey.
set the public sector matching elasticity with respect to unemployment, g, at 0.2 and p at
0.5, slightly higher than the estimated value but in line with estimates from the literature
(Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)).
A recent paper by Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2009) provides some insights
into the duration of vacancies by sector. They use JOLTS data to study the behaviour of
vacancies and hiring. After adjusting the data, they estimate that the duration of a vacancy
is 30 days for the government and 20 days for the private sector. I calibrate the matching
eciency i to reproduce these numbers ( qp = 3:9 and  qg = 2:5).
The United Kingdom has a unique source of data on recruitment costs. Every year, the
Chartered Institute of Personal Development carries out a survey of recruitment practices
of around 800 organizations from dierent sectors: manufacturing and production, private
sector services, public sector services and voluntary, community and not-for-prot (CIPD
(2009)). The costs of recruiting a worker, which encompass advertising and agency costs,
are for the median rm around $4000, corresponding to roughly 8 weeks of the median
income in the United Kingdom. On average, these costs are 40 percent lower in the public
sector.6 I take these values as indicative that the cost per hire is lower in the public sector.
I consider the cost of posting a vacancy &i to be 2 in the private sector and 1.1 in the public
sector. Given that the duration of a vacancy is higher in the public sector, these values
imply that the average cost of recruiting expressed in the same units is 15 percent lower
than in the private sector. Under this calibration, the sum of recruitment costs is close to 3
percent of the total labour costs, value found in Russo, Hassink, and Gorter (2005). It also
6Also, the median rm takes 12 weeks to recruit a new worker while in the public sector it takes 30
percent longer. See appendix for the disaggregated values. Another study by the National Audit Oce
(2009) that analyses the recruitment practices in the central government nds that it takes 16 weeks to
recruit a new worker, costing between $1600 and $2200, which is consistent with the CIPD study.
13implies that the cost of recruiting per hire equals to around 5 to 7 weeks of wages, which is
consistent with the evidence for the United Kingdom and with the study by Boca and Rota
(1998).
Estimates of public sector wage premium have proved quite sensitive to the country
choice, education and sex of a worker or even the sub-sector of the government. The survey
by Gregory and Borland (1999) places the premium between 0 and 10 percent. I set it close
to the lower bound, at 2 percent (   wg
 wp = 1:02).
The empirical evidence relative to the substitution elasticity between private and govern-
ment consumption is not conclusive. Evans and Karras (1998) nd that private consumption
is complement to military expenditure and substitute to non-military expenditure. Fiorito
and Kollintzas (2004) disaggregate expenditure into \public goods" (defence, public order,
and justice) and \merit goods" (health, education, and other services). They nd that \pub-
lic goods" are substitutes and \merit goods" are complements to private consumption. As
it is hard to select one value for , I consider an elasticity of substitution of 1 ( = 0:0).
In Section 7 I discuss the cases where the goods are substitutes ( = 0:5) and complements
( =  0:5). The parameter , that reects the preference for government services, is chosen
such that the optimal level of public sector employment is 0:15.
For the model to satisfy the Hosios condition in the private sector, the worker's share in
the Nash bargaining is set at 0.5. The value of leisure in the utility function is calibrated, such
that the unemployment rate in steady-state is 0.06 and implies an outside option equivalent
to 42 percent of the average wage. Technology in both sectors is normalised to 1 and the
discount factor is set at 0.99. Table 2 summarises the baseline calibration and the implied
steady-state values for some of the variables.
Table 2: Baseline calibration
Parameters
ap 1 p 0:5 &p 2:0 p 1:71 p 0:06  lg 0:15
ag 1 g 0:2 &g 1:1 g 1:97 g 0:03  1:02
 0  0:18  0:46  0:99 b 0:5
Steady-state variables
 u 0:06  qg 2:5  fg 0:075  pg 0:37  s 0:20
&p vp+&g vg ug
uc P
 wi li 0:029
 lp 0:79  qp 3:9  fp 0:79  pg 0:99
l
uc  wg 0:42
 Wg  U
 Wp  U 2:69
144 Attaining the steady-state constrained ecient allo-
cation
The constrained ecient steady-state allocation consists of a triplet of f vp,  vg,  sg. In order
to achieve it, the government can post the optimal number of vacancies directly, but it still
has to induce an optimal share of the unemployed searching for public sector jobs. The
government can do so by choosing an appropriate level of the public sector wage.
Proposition 1 If the government sets the optimal level of public sector vacancies and sets
a wage such that the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs is optimal then,
if the bargaining power of the workers is equal to the matching elasticity with respect to
unemployment in the private sector (b = p), the steady-state level of vacancies in the private
sector is optimal.
The proof is in the companion appendix. In a one-sector model, the rm's vacancy
posting behaviour entails a positive and a negative externality: it increases the probability
of an unemployed nding a job but reduces the other rms' probability of lling a vacancy.
The decentralised equilibrium is ecient if the share of the surplus of a match that goes to
the rm (1   b) is equal to the importance of vacancies in the matching process (1   p),
in what is usually called the Hosios condition. When we include the public sector, besides
the externalities of public sector vacancies there are also the ones arising from the directed
search. If more unemployed search in the public sector, the probability of lling a vacancy
is higher in the public sector but lower for private sector rms. What this proposition states
is that if the government is able to internalise the externalities in  vg,  wg, the vacancies in
the private sector will also be ecient, provided that the Hosios condition is satised.
Let us assume the government sets its wage as a premium over the private sector wage:
 wg =   wp. Even though we cannot get an analytical solution for the optimal wage ratio, we
can nd it numerically. Under the baseline calibration the optimal public sector wage is 3%
lower than in the private sector. This value depends mainly on the dierence between the
friction parameters in the public and private sectors. Figure 3 shows how the optimal wage
ratio varies with the parameters of the public sector.7
When the cost of posting vacancies is lower or when the matching depends more on vacan-
cies (lower g), it is more ecient to have more vacancies and fewer unemployed searching in
the public sector. In order to induce it, the government should pay less to its workers. When
7The companion appendix shows how the optimal share of unemployed searching in the two sectors,
unemployment rate and wages in the two sectors vary with the parameters.
15Figure 3: Optimal steady-state public-private wage ratio
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the separation rate decreases or the matching becomes more ecient, more unemployed turn
into the public sector, but it is optimal to have fewer. The private incentive is not ecient
and, thus, the government should oer lower wages to correct it.
The optimal wage ratio does not depend on the coecients of the utility function: 
and , but it depends on the disutility of working () and on the productivity of the public
sector. Higher , raises the value of employment in the private sector relative to the public
sector, because people are more likely to have another spell of unemployment there. As
it induces more unemployed to search in the private sector, the government needs to oer
higher wages to oset it. If government jobs are less productive, the relative cost of posting
vacancies is higher because the marginal utility of public sector goods goes up. Although
the social planner wants fewer government jobs, it prefers the new matches to be driven by
the unemployment side, which requires higher public sector wages.
To investigate the consequences of paying more to public sector employees, I compare
the unemployment rate and households' welfare when the public sector wage is optimal (a
gap of 3 percent) with the baseline case (a premium of 2 percent). The unemployment
rate which was calibrated to 6 percent in the baseline steady-state, falls to 5 percent when
the government sets the optimal wage. This happens because many unemployed that were
queuing for public sector jobs, now nd it more attractive to search in the private sector (from
20 to 3 percent), boosting job creation. The public sector wage is an important determinant
16of equilibrium unemployment. In terms of welfare, moving to the optimal wage generates a
gain of 0.6 percent of steady-state consumption.
5 The eects of scal shocks
In this framework there are several scal shocks. We can distinguish shocks to wages from
shocks to employment. Furthermore, an employment shock can be driven by hirings or by
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The shocks i
t follow and AR(1) process with autocorrelation coecient of 0.8. We start
from the baseline steady-state. I assume that, under a hiring shock, the government holds the
public sector wage constant, while under a wage shock it maintains the level of employment
constant.8 Finally, under the separation shock, I consider that both the wage and vacancies
are kept at their steady-state level.
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of the variables to a separation rate and a vacancies
shock that generate an increase of 6.6 percent of public sector employment, equivalent to 1
percentage point of the labour force. The peak in government employment takes place 10
quarters after the shock. For comparison, I consider a shock to wages of 6.6 percent. In
terms of magnitude, they are equivalent to a scal stimulus of 1 percent of aggregate income.
Both employment shocks crowd out private sector employment through three channels.
First, as there are fewer unemployed available, the cost of hiring an extra worker increases.
Second, either because the probability of getting a job is higher or the separation rate is lower,
more unemployed search in the public sector, which further reduces the rms' vacancy-lling
probability. Finally, as the overall job-nding probability increases so does the value of being
unemployed, which raises the private sector wage through the wage bargaining.
Now, the question is whether the crowding out of private sector employment is partial, or
whether it outweighs the increase in public sector employment and raises unemployment. Fol-
8I could alternatively assume that under the wage shock the vacancies are constant. If the government
sets the number of vacancies, as more unemployed search for government jobs, public sector employment
increases after a wage shock. Under this policy, the shock to wages also incorporates a shock to employment.
This does not change qualitatively the results.
17Figure 4: Response to scal shocks (Baseline steady-state)
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Note: Solid line (vacancies shock); dash line (separations shock) and dotted line (wage shock). The response
of the variables is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for the unemployment rate and the share
of unemployed searching for public sector jobs, which is in percentage points dierence from the steady-state.
lowing the separation rate shock, the unemployment rate declines by 0.2 percentage points,
but a vacancies shock raises the unemployment rate by 0.4 percentage points. There are two
explanations for these reversed eects. First, an increase in employment through hiring in-
duces many more unemployed to look for public sector jobs, rather than if it is done through
retention of workers. Under the hiring shock, the share of unemployed searching for public
sector jobs goes up by 12 percentage points, but only by 2 percentage points following a
separation shock. Additionally, the eect of a vacancy shock on the private sector wage is
four times stronger than the shock to separations.
An increase in the public sector wage reduces private sector employment via two channels.
On the one hand, the increase of the public sector wage spills over to the private sector, with
an elasticity of around 0.05. On the other hand, it induces more unemployed to search for a
18job in the public sector, which reduces the probability of lling a vacancy for the rms. As
a consequence, they posts fewer vacancies and unemployment rises.
All the scal shocks raise the private sector wage, even in the presence of a negative
wealth eect. As they crowd out private production, they raise the marginal utility of
private consumption lowering the relative value of leisure. The increase in the probability of
nding a job in the public sector or its value is large enough to oset this eect.
Figure 5 compares the response of the unemployment rate to scal shocks when we start
from the ecient steady-state. With lower steady-state public sector wages, a hiring shock
reduces unemployment, as opposed to when we start from the baseline steady-state. When
the government opens new vacancies, if the wage rate is high, many more unemployed queue
for these positions, thus enhancing the crowding out eect on private sector job creation.
The opposite eect of the dierent types of scal shocks on unemployment is an impor-
tant result. The vast literature that tries to understand the eects of government spending
tends to be inconclusive. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) nd that after a military ex-
penditure shock (both military purchases and employment) real wages go up, but Edelberg,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) and Ramey and Shapiro (1998) nd that after a government
military purchases shock real wages go down. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), as well as Fat as
and Mihov (2001) nd that private consumption increases after a government consumption
shock but Mountford and Uhlig (2008) and Ramey (2009) report a negative or zero response.
Most of the discussion has focused on the technical methodology, particularly on the iden-
tication of scal shocks. In light of my results, I think the contradictory evidence might
not due to methodological issues. Fiscal policy shocks can have dierent eects depending
on the type of expenditure considered. Increasing the wage of all employees by 1 percent
is dierent from increasing employment by 1 percent. The model even suggests that the
Figure 5: Response of unemployment rate to scal shocks (baseline and ecient steady-state)



























Note: Solid line (ecient steady-state) and dash line (baseline steady-state). The response is in percentage
points dierence from the steady-state.
19eects of government employment can be dierent, depending if the adjustment takes place
through hiring or separations.
6 Public sector policies and the business cycle
One of the main conclusions of the Real Business Cycle literature is that governments should
not pursue active business cycle policies. Although the model is, in essence, a real business
cycle model with only real frictions, the policy prescription is quite dierent. Let us examine
the eects of a 1 percent negative private technology shock on the economy, under alternative
government policies. I again consider an AR(1) shock with autoregressive coecient of 0.9.
ln(a
p




Figure 6 shows the impulse responses, starting from the ecient steady-state, when the
government follows the optimal rule. I contrast the optimal policy with simple rules for
vacancies and wage as follows:
log(v
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Existing evidence by Lane (2003) and Lamo, P erez, and Schuknecht (2008) suggest that
public sector wages are less procyclical than private sector wages, particularly in the United
States.9 For the sake of simplicity, I consider two cases where the public sector wage is
acyclical ( w = 0). In the rst one, the public sector vacancies decline proportionally to
increases in private sector vacancies ( v =  1). In the second, they are acyclical ( v = 0).
After the negative productivity shock, private sector rms post fewer vacancies, the
probability of nding a job there falls and the unemployed increase their search for public
sector jobs. The unemployment rate increases at most by 0.05 percentage points, much less
than after scal shocks. As pointed out by Shimer (2005), search and matching models are
not able to generate enough uctuations on unemployment in response to technology shocks.
The optimal government policy is to have countercyclical vacancies and procyclical wages.
The argument for hiring more people in recessions is one of sector reallocation, dierent from
the traditional demand argument (bringing to mind the famous metaphor of digging holes
9Additionally, a study by Devereux and Hart (2006) using micro data for the United Kingdom nds that
for job movers in the private sector the wages are procyclical but for the public sector they are acyclical.
20Figure 6: Response to a private sector technology shock under the optimal policy
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Note: Solid line (optimal policy); dash line (countercyclical vacancies and acyclical wages) and dotted line
(acyclical vacancies and wages). The response of the variables is in percentage of their steady-state value,
except for the unemployment rate and the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs, which is in
percentage points dierence from the steady-state.
and covering them). If the private sector has lower productivity, it is better for the economy
to absorb part of the unused labour force into the public sector. If the government jobs were
not productive, it would not be optimal to hire anyone in the rst place.
On the other hand, the public sector wage should follow the decline of the private sector
wage. In recessions, if the government keeps its wage constant, it becomes more attractive
relative to the private sector, thus increasing the share of unemployed searching for public
sector jobs. This reduces the vacancy-lling probability in the private sector, which further
dampens job creation and amplies the business cycle. We can see that under the two
exogenous rules, the response of unemployment is much stronger. There is an increase of 1.6
percentage points of the share of unemployed searching of public sector jobs, much higher
21Table 3: Business cycle properties under the dierent policies










No government 0:0007   0:0007 0:024   0:028%
Optimal policy 0:0008 0:0007 0:0006 0:024 0:97 0:023%
Rule ( w = 0,  v =  1) 0:0159 0:0830 0:0014 0:023 0:18 0:101%
Rule ( w = 0,  v = 0) 0:0132 0:0673 0:0014 0:023 0:27 0:077%
than under the optimal policy (0.02 percentage points).
Table 3 compares the standard deviation of the key variables under the alternative poli-
cies, as well as when there is no public sector. If the government follows the optimal rule,
the presence of public sector employment stabilises unemployment. However, if public sector
wages are acyclical the volatility of unemployment increases twofold. The eects of the pres-
ence of public sector employment on the volatility of unemployment depends crucially on
the government's business cycle policy. The last column presents the welfare cost of business
cycles under the dierent scenarios.10 When the public sector is absent, the welfare cost of
uctuations is very small - around 0.028 percent of steady-state consumption. This is a well
known result. When the public sector is present, under the optimal policy, the welfare cost
of uctuations is lower, but if the government wages do not respond to the cycle, it can be
up to four times higher.
In their paper, Quadrini and Trigari (2007) have two conclusions contrary to mine. First,
that the best policy to stabilize total employment is to have procyclical public sector employ-
ment. Second, that the presence of the public sector increases the volatility of unemployment.
In their model, the government does not choose their wage optimally. Instead, it sets a wage
premium exogenously, which explains the disparity of the conclusions. As we have seen in the
previous section, under a high public sector wage premium, after a hiring shock, the crowd-
ing out of the private sector employment can be more than complete, resulting in higher
unemployment. This switch alters the policy recommendations for government employment.
7 Extensions11
7.1 Government services as goods bought from the private sector
To compare the results with the ones from a typical model of government consumption,
I construct an extension where there is no public sector employment (l
g
t = 0), but where
10See the companion appendix for details.
11All gures can be found in the companion appendix.
22the government buys its goods from the private sector (ct + gt = yt). I am interested in
the response to a government consumption shock of 6.6 percent (Figure 7) and the optimal
response of government consumption to a negative technology shock.
There are three main dierences relative to the benchmark model. Notice rst that the
eects of a scal shock on private sector employment and wages are the opposite from the
model with public sector employment. The wages go down because the reduction of private
consumption raises its marginal utility, lowering the value of unemployment. Because of the
direct stimulus, private employment goes up and unemployment goes down.
The second dierence is the magnitude of the response of unemployment. A shock of
6.6 percent in government spending only reduces unemployment by 0.008 percentage points.
Both technology and government consumption shocks have a small quantitative eect on
unemployment. However, as public sector employment or wage shocks strike directly in the
labour market, they have a much stronger eect. Finally, the dierences are also visible
in the optimal business cycle policy. In recessions, the government should buy fewer goods
from the private sector, in order to equate the marginal utility of the two goods.
Figure 7: Response to a government consumption shock





























Note: The response of the variables is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for the unemployment
rate which is shown as percentage points dierence from the steady-state.
7.2 Productive sector public employment
A recent paper by Linnemann (2009) nds, in the context of a VAR, that a government
employment shock generates a positive response in the private sector employment. I want to
see if this can be generated within the model, if we consider that public sector employment
aects the productivity of the private sector. I consider that private sector technology follows:
ln(a
p
t) = ln( a
p) + [ln(l
g
t)   ln( l
g)]: (23)
23I look at the responses of unemployment and private sector employment to a separation and
vacancies shocks for dierent values of . For higher levels of , the crowding out eect on
private employment is lower and, therefore, it has a larger negative impact on unemployment.
However, even with a value as high as 0.4, the crowding out is still substantial.
7.3 Dierent elasticities of substitution between goods
I have also re-done the exercises for the cases where the goods are substitutes or comple-
ments. Regarding employment shocks, the qualitative results do not depend on , and even
quantitatively the dierences are small. If the goods are complements, the increase in gov-
ernment services raises the marginal utility of the private good, so the negative eect on
private sector employment is smaller. If they are substitutes, the household reduces more
private consumption, leading to a bigger crowding out of private sector employment.
With respect to the optimal business cycle policy, the result of counter-cyclical vacancies
is only overturned if the goods are strong complements. If that is the case, during a recession,
as the marginal utility of the government services falls with the consumption of the private
good, the government should also decrease its vacancies. However, in all scenarios the public
sector wage should follow the decline of the private sector wage.
7.4 Optimal policy under alternative sources of uctuations
When discussing the optimal policy along the business cycle, I assumed it was generated by
technology shocks from which the public sector was isolated. Now, I consider two alternative
sources of uctuations: an aggregate technology shock and a shock to the discount factor.
The result of procyclical wages holds for the two shocks, but the result of countercyclical
vacancies is reversed. Following an economy-wide technological shock, as the public sector is
also less productive, the argument for sector reallocation does not hold and the government
should also decrease its vacancies. If people become more impatient, the present discounted
value of a vacancy goes down. As it aects both sectors symmetrically, both the private
sector and the government should decrease their vacancies and wages.
248 How important is the directed search between the
public and the private sector?
The theoretical model has one important policy prescription: government wages should
keep track of the private sector wages over the business cycle. If not, the volatility of
unemployment is higher because of the uctuation of the share of unemployed searching
for public sector jobs. It is clear that this result is entirely driven by the directed search
assumption. The aim of this section is to show that the assumption is realistic. I begin by
presenting some evidence from micro-econometric studies.
As mentioned previously, public sector wage premium varies substantially within groups.
As reported in Gregory and Borland (1999), the premium is much higher for females, veterans
and minorities, and it is higher for federal government employees compared to state or local
government employees. There are also dierences across education levels. Katz and Krueger
(1991) nd that in the previous twenty years, more educated individuals tend to be paid less
in the public sector, while individuals with less education tend to receive a higher premium.
If people can direct their search, these dierences should have repercussions.
Gregory and Borland (1999) report a number of studies that have found the existence
of queues for federal public jobs. For example, Venti (1985) nds that for each federal
government job opening, there are 2.8 men and 6.1 times as many women that want the job.
Katz and Krueger (1991) nd that blue collar workers are willing to queue to obtain public
sector jobs, whereas highly-skilled workers are dicult to recruit and retain in the public
sector. A recent study for the United Kingdom by Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) also nds
evidence of job queuing for public sector jobs among low-employability individuals, who face
larger potential premia from working there.
Most studies that estimate the public sector wage premium use switching regression
models. The idea is that the unemployed can self-select to work in the sectors in which
they have more advantages. Blank (1985) nds that, among other factors, sectoral choice
is inuenced by wage comparison. Heitmueller (2006) manages to quantify this eect and
nds that an increase of 1 percent in the expected wage in the public sector increases the
probability of being employed in that sector by 1.3 for men and 2.9 percent for women.
The micro evidence supports the directed search assumption, but it does not imply that,
from a macroeconomic perspective, the mechanism plays a role over the business cycle. In
this section, I estimate a log-linearized version of the model using Bayesian methods as in
Smets and Wouters (2007) and Sala, S oderstr om, and Trigari (2008). The main purpose is
25to evaluate the mechanism of directed search between the two sectors. Additionally, I can
also assess the cyclicality of the public sector wages and vacancies, as well as get estimates
for some of the key friction parameters.
8.1 Estimation preliminaries
In order to test if the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs uctuates over
the business cycle, I modify the equation determining it (10). The log-linearised expression
is:
~ st = (1    s)Et(~ x
g
t+1   ~ x
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t+1   ~ m
p




t is the log-deviations from steady-state of W i
t   Ui
t. From the original expression, I
have added the parameter  that measures the signicance of the mechanism. If it is close
to 0, the data does not support the assumption. As in the theoretical section, I assume two
rules for public sector wages and vacancies. However, I consider that each variable responds
to a moving average of the private counterpart:
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Following one of the extensions, I allow the private sector technology to depend partially
on the level of public sector employment, though a coecient , to be estimated.
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I use US quarterly data from 1948:1 to 2007:1 for 6 variables: unemployment rate, gov-
ernment employment (% of labour force), government per employee real wage, private sector
per hour real wage, aggregate job-separation rate and aggregate job-nding rate. The se-
ries of government per employee real wage is calculated by dividing the compensation of
government workers from the NIPA tables by the government employment. The monthly
job-nding and job-separation rates are taken from Shimer (2007) and are transformed into
quarterly, by allowing for multiple transitions between the two states within the quarter. All
other variables are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
I include 6 dierent shocks: government vacancies, government wages, separation rates
in both sectors, bargaining power and private sector technology. The variables enter the
26estimation in demeaned log-dierences. 12
I calibrate the utility function parameter  to be equal to 0.18,  to 0.99 and I normalise
the technology in both sectors to 1. In each iteration, the steady-state public sector vacancies
are set such that, in equilibrium, the employment in the sector is 0.15 while the steady-state
public sector wage is set as a premium over the private sector. Instead of establishing the
prior over the matching eciencies, I opt for doing it on the steady-state probability of lling
a vacancy  qi.
I assume that the matching elasticities with respect to unemployment, the steady-state
bargaining power of the unemployed and the autoregressive coecients of the shock process
have a Beta distribution. I assume that the standard deviations of the shocks have an inverse
gamma distribution. All other parameters are assumed to be normally distributed. Given
the strong evidence presented in Section 3, the prior mean for the separation rates is 0.06
for the private and 0.03 for the public sector. Also, the prior mean of  qi is 3.9 for the private
(duration of a vacancy of 20 days) and 2.5 for the public sector (30 days). However, as the
matching elasticity in the public sector came from a back-of-the-envelope calculation, I start
with the prior that the mean and standard deviation are the same across sectors. The prior
distribution of  and of the business cycle policy parameters is centered around 0 with a
standard deviation of 0.3.
8.2 Results
I estimate the model with Bayesian methods (see An and Schorfheide (2007) for a review).
The likelihood function of the model is combined with the prior distribution of the parameters
to obtain the posterior distribution. Subsequently, 2,000,000 draws of the posterior are
generated with the Metropolis Hastings algorithm, where the step size is chosen such that the
acceptance rate is around 1/3. The draws are divided into two chains with dierent starting
values. The rst 2,500 draws of each chain are dropped. Given the recent studies alerting for
identication problems in DSGE models (Canova and Sala (2009)), I have done estimations
with simulated data. Although there are several parameters that are not identied using the
data, the main parameters of interest are, namely: ,  w,  v, p, g and all the parameters
of the shock processes.
12With the exception of the wages, all other variables are stationary. As a robustness check, I have
also estimated the model with the stationary variables entering in levels and the wages in demeaned log-
dierences. The posterior distributions are quite close between the two versions. The results, as well as
all the equations of the model in its log-linearized form and the relation of the observable variables to the
model's variables can be found in the companion appendix.
27Table 4: Prior and posterior distribution of structural parameters




Elasticity of substitution (public and private goods)  Normal (0, 0.1) 0.014 (-0.129, 0.146)
Utility of unemployment  Normal (0.5, 0.1) 0.352 (0.245, 0.470)
Separation rate (private sector) p Normal (0.06, 0.01) 0.016 (0.010, 0.023)
Separation rate (public sector) g Normal (0.03, 0.01) 0.015 (0.011, 0.019)
Cost of posting vacancy (private sector) &p Normal (2, 0.3) 1.628 (1.136, 2.121)
Cost of posting vacancy (public sector) &g Normal (1.1, 0.2) 1.200 (0.886, 1.512)
Vacancy lling probability (private sector)  qp Normal (3.9, 0.2) 3.989 (3.700, 4.300)
Vacancy lling probability (public sector)  qg Normal (2.5, 0.2) 2.486 (2.152, 2.796)
Matching elasticity w.r.t unemployment (private) p Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.647 (0.560, 0.753)
Matching elasticity w.r.t unemployment (public) g Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.159 (0.060, 0.258)
Bargaining power b Beta (0.5, 0.10) 0.638 (0.537, 0.735)
Public sector wage premium  Normal (1.02, 0.01) 1.031 (1.017, 1.043)
Productivity of public employment  Normal (0, 0.1) 0.167 (0.082, 0.249)
Business cycle response of public sector wages  w Normal (0, 0.3) 0.428 (0.165, 0.685)
Business cycle response of public sector vacancies  v Normal (0, 0.3) -0.937 (-1.225, -0.656)
Importance of directed search  Normal (0, 0.3) 0.479 (0.381, 0.579)
Autoregressive parameters
Productivity a Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.987 (0.980, 0.994)
Public sector wage w Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.973 (0.956, 0.990)
Public sector vacancies v Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.281 (0.182, 0.383)
Private sector separation rate lp Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.952 (0.917, 0.988)
Public sector separation rate lg Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.500 (0.265, 0.768)
Bargaining power b Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.936 (0.892, 0.977)
Standard deviations
Productivity a IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.008 (0.007, 0.008)
Public sector wage w IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.011 (0.010, 0.012)
Public sector vacancies v IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.439 (0.305, 0.554)
Private sector separation rate lp IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.071 (0.064, 0.077)
Public sector separation rate lg IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.011 (0.002, 0.021)
Bargaining power b IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.033 (0.017, 0.056)
Table 4 reports the prior distribution and the mean, the 5th and the 95th percentile of
the posterior distribution of the parameters. The mean of the posterior distribution of 
is close 0.5 with a 90 percent interval between 0.4 and 0.6. This suggests that, although
st does not uctuate as much as the model predicts, the mechanism still has explanatory
power. With respect to the policy, there is a strong countercyclical policy in vacancies with
an estimated mean close to  0:9. Public sector wage policy seems slightly procyclical, with
the posterior mean of  w of around 0:4.
The elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment is much lower in
the public sector. The posterior mean for the private sector is around 0:65, but only 0:16 in
the public sector. The steady-state vacancy lling probability in both sectors do not seem to
be identied, as well as the cost of posting vacancies in the public sector and the elasticity of
28substitution between the two consumption goods. The posterior mean of the cost of posting
vacancies in the private sector is around 1.6. The posterior distributions of both separation
rates are very similar, both centered at 0.015.
The posterior mean of the ow value of unemployment is around 0.35, while of the
bargaining power is around 0.6. The posterior distribution of  is centered around 0.15. This
value suggests that public employment might increase the productivity of the private sector
or, alternatively, it might be capturing demand eects that are absent from the model.13
8.3 Model Comparison
To show how the model with directed search performs, I compare it with two alternative
models: one, where there are no uctuations in the share of unemployed searching in the
public sector ( = 0) and the other with random search, where the new matches depend
only on the relative number of vacancies.14 I compare them from two angles. First, to see
how well they explain the variables used in the estimation, I compare the logarithms of the
marginal data density, computed using the Mean-Harmonic Estimator. An alternative way
to compare the models is to look at the predictions for an unobserved variable. I use the
Help-Wanted index as a proxy for private sector vacancies and look at its correlation with
the predicted series, as well as compare the volatility of the two series. I also compare the
prediction for labour market tightness. The results are shown in Table 5.
The marginal data density is higher for the directed search model. The numbers imply
that we would need a prior probability over the directed search model parameters 5:81014(=
exp(3185 3151)) times larger than our prior over the random search model in order to reject
the fact that the share of unemployed searching for public sector jobs uctuates in response
to shocks. The Random search model does slightly better than the Directed search model
in terms of the correlation of predicted vacancies with the actual values, but it does poorly
in predicting the volatility of vacancies, as well as the moments of labour market tightness.
13I have also estimated the model for three subsamples of roughly 20 years: 1948:1 to 1967:3, 1967:4 to
1987:2 and 1987:3 to 2007:1. The results can be found in the companion appendix. The parameter  was
important in the rst two subperiods (posterior mean close to 0.5), but its importance has diminished during
the period of the great moderation. The parameter  was quite high during the rst period (posterior mean
close to 0.25), suggesting that there were strong complementarities in the production function which have
disappeared in the last two decades. All other parameters are quite stable.
14Details in the companion appendix.
29Table 5: Model Comparison










Density (ve;vd) (( v
u)e;( v
u)d)
Directed search 3185.0 0.90 0.52 0.65 0.88
Directed search ( = 0) 3154.0 0.90 0.49 0.67 0.88
Random search 3151.0 0.79 0.68 0.59 0.76
Note: v represents private sector vacancies. The superscript e refers to the estimated series
and d refers to the data (Help-wanted index).
9 Conclusion
This paper examines the links between the public and the private sector through the labour
market. I have built a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search and match-
ing frictions to analyse the eects of scal shocks, as well as to understand the optimal
employment and wage policy.
The main normative conclusion is that the government's wage policy plays a key role in
attaining the ecient allocation. In steady-state, the optimal public sector wage premium
should reect dierences in the labour market friction parameters. Under the baseline cali-
bration, the optimal wage is 3 percent below the private sector. In reality, all studies point
to the existence of a wage premium in the public sector. Although there are other reasons
for governments to set higher wages, namely to induce eort or to avoid corruption, they
should weight its costs in terms of ineciency in the labour market.
Over the business cycle, public sector wages should follow the wages in the private sector.
Otherwise, in recessions too many people queue for public sector jobs and in expansions few
people apply for them. Although I have abstracted from nancing issues, a procyclical public
sector wage policy has the advantage of requiring a lower tax burden in recessions. However,
it also has problems. First, lowering public sector wages in recessions might be politically
dicult to implement. Yet, to achieve eciency in the labour market the only relevant wages
are those of the new hires which are potentially easier to reduce in recessions. The second
problem related to implementation is that wages in the public sector are usually decided
annually. One possible solution is to index the wage growth in the public sector to private
sector wage growth. Finally, I have ignored the insurance role of the government. If agents
are risk averse, they would prefer to have a constant income prole throughout the business
cycle, which is an argument for acyclical wages. While this is a valid line of reasoning, one
has to realise that the intertemporal insurance is achieved at the cost of stronger uctuations
in unemployment.
30Additionally, the baseline model suggests that it is optimal to have a leaning-against-
the-wind vacancies policy. While the result of procyclical wages is very robust, the result
of counter-cyclical vacancies should be interpreted with caution because it does not hold
in a number of settings: if the goods are complements, if the shocks aect both sectors
symmetrically or if the steady-state public sector wage is higher than optimum.
The main positive conclusion is that the response of the labour market variables to
scal shocks depends on the type of shock considered. A reduction of separations lowers
unemployment, an increase in wages raises it, while hiring more people can increase or
decrease unemployment. All shocks raise the wage and crowd out employment in the private
sector. Conversely, when the government buys goods from the private sector, a scal shock
lowers the wage and increases employment in the private sector. The mixed eects of the
dierent components of government consumption on the labour market might be one reason
why many empirical studies on the eects of government spending nd ambiguous results.
Many of the model's results rely on the assumption that unemployed can direct their
search between the private and the public sector. I believe that this mechanism is playing
a signicant role during the current recession. A casual look through the newspapers gives
the impression that the unemployed are turning to the public sector for jobs, but also that
the wages there have not suered as much as in the private sector. Albeit great praise for
their reactions against the economic crises, governments can still do better.
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35Appendix I - Data











Cost of recruiting ($)
Senior managers 15123 13396 18964 10452 8534
Managers and professionals 9738 8050 12393 6067 6471
Administrative, secretarial
and technical
4519 3680 5628 1935 4976
Services (costumer, per-
sonal and sales)
8996 4565 13980 2327 1399
Manual, craft workers 2381 2498 2978 1898 1379
Time to ll a vacancy (weeks)
Senior managers 17.1 16.8 16.5 18 16.6
Managers and professionals 12.5 12.1 11.8 14.3 11.8
Administrative, secretarial
and technical
6.5 6.0 7.1 9.1 7.1
Services (costumer, per-
sonal and sales)
7.0 6.7 5.6 9.9 7.4
Manual, craft workers 5.9 5.2 4.5 8.3 6.3
Table A2: Data - denition and sources





All Employees: Government (BLS) 1939q1-2008q3
w
g
t Government per em-
ployee real wage
Government consumption expenditures: Com-
pensation of general government employees / gov-
ernment employees, deated by CPI (BEA-NIPA






Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour (BLS) 1947q1- 2008q2
ut Unemployment rate Civilian Unemployment Rate (BLS) 1948q1-2008q3
v
p
t Vacancies Index of Help Wanted Advertising in Newspapers
(The Conference Board)
1951q1- 2006q2
t Separation rate Job-separation rate (Shimer, own calculation for
quarterly aggregation)
1948q1-2007q1
ft Job-nding rate Job-nding rate (Shimer, own calculation for
quarterly aggregation)
1948q1- 2007q1
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Note: The growth rate of the four-weeks average index of keyword searches, relative the same
four weeks in the previous year.
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Appendix II - Steady-state optimal wages, search and unemploy-
ment
Figures A3, A4 and A5 show the optimal steady-state wages in both sectors, the share of
unemployed searching in the public sector and the unemployment rate as a function of the
labour market friction parameters in the public sector, as well as the technology and utility
function parameters.
Figure A3: Optimal steady-state public and private sector wages
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Note: The solid line is the optimal public sector wage and the dash line is the optimal private sector wages.COMPANION APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 39
Figure A4: Optimal steady-state share of unemployed searching in the public sector
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Figure A5: Optimal steady-state unemployment rate
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Appendix III - Extensions
Gov. services as goods bought from the private sector
Figure A6: Optimal policy with government consumption
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Note: The response of the variables is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for unemployment
rate which is in percentage points dierence from steady-state.COMPANION APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 42
Productive sector public employment
Figure A7: Response to a public employment shock
Unemployment rate
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Note: Solid line ( = 0:0); dash line ( = 0:2) and dotted line ( = 0:4). The response of the private
employment is in percentage of its steady-state value and unemployment rate in percentage points dierence
from steady-state.COMPANION APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 43
Different elasticities of substitution between goods
As it is hard to select one value for , I distinguish three cases: if the goods are substitutes
( = 0:5), complements ( =  0:5) and one where the elasticity of substitution of 1 ( = 0:0).
Figures A8, A9 and A10 show the impulse responses to the dierent scal shocks, for dierent
levels of .
Figure A8: Response to a public sector wage shock (Baseline steady-state)
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Note: Solid line ( = 0:0); dash line ( = 0:5) and dotted line ( =  0:5). The response of the variables
is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for the unemployment rate and the share of unemployed
searching for public sector jobs, which is in percentage points di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Figure A9: Response to a public sector vacancies shock (Baseline steady-state)
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Note: Solid line ( = 0:0); dash line ( = 0:5) and dotted line ( =  0:5). The response of the variables
is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for the unemployment rate and the share of unemployed
searching for public sector jobs, which is in percentage points di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Figure A10: Response to a public sector separation shock (Baseline steady-state)
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Note: Solid line ( = 0:0); dash line ( = 0:5) and dotted line ( =  0:5). The response of the variables
is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for the unemployment rate and the share of unemployed
searching for public sector jobs, which is in percentage points di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Finally, Figure A11 shows the optimal business cycle policy for dierent elasticities. As we
see the result of countercyclical vacancies does not hold if the private and public consumption
good are complements.
Figure A11: Optimal business cycle policy under dierent elasticities
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Note: Solid line ( = 0:0); dash line ( = 0:5) and dotted line ( =  0:5). The response of the variables
is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for the unemployment rate and the share of unemployed
searching for public sector jobs, which is in percentage points di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Optimal policy under alternative sources of fluctuations
Figure A12: Optimal policy under an economy-wide technology shock
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Note: The response of the variables is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for unemployment
rate which is in percentage points dierence from steady-state.
Figure A13: Optimal policy under a discount factor shock
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Note: The response of the variables is in percentage of their steady-state value, except for unemployment
rate which is in percentage points di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Appendix IV - Derivations
Social planner's problem
The social planner maximises the consumer's utility (4) subject to the technology con-


























































































































































Plugging the rst two equations in the third one gives the implicit expression for optimal









(1   p)(1   st)
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1 st , we can use it to





















































Proof of Proposition 1
Plugging the steady-state expressions for the value of job, unemployment and employment
in the Nash sharing rule gives us:
(1   b)
 wp   u
uc
1   (1   p    mp
(1  s) u)
= b
 ap    wp
1   (1   p)
:COMPANION APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 49
The decision rule for private sector vacancies is given by the free-entry condition of rms:
&p
 qp(1   (1   
p)) = [ a
p    w
p]:





= (1   (1   
p  
 mp
(1    s) u
))
b&p
(1   b) qp
:





] = (1   (1   
p  
 mp
(1    s) u
))
b&p
(1   b) qp
+
&p
 qp(1   (1   
p)):





] = (1   (1   
p))
&p
(1   b) qp
+
b&p  mp
(1    s) u(1   b) qp;
which can be re-written as:
(1   (1   
p))
&p






(1    s) u
]:
This is equivalent to the social planner's rst order condition for private vacancies if b = p.
Welfare costs of high public sector wages
Let fcopt;gopt;uoptg be the steady-state private and government consumption, and un-
employment under the optimal public sector wage. The f c;  g;  ug is the allocation under an
exogenous public sector wage. We want to nd what is the welfare gain as a percentage
of steady-state private consumption of having the optimal steady-state public sector wage
(Section 4). This is given by x that solves the following equation:
u(copt;gopt) + (uopt) = u((1 + x) c;  g) + ( u):










  1; 6= 0:
If  = 0, the utility function is not dened, so I use the equivalent u(ct;gt) = ln(ct)+ ln(gt).
The welfare cost in terms of steady state consumption is then given by:
x =
exp[ln(copt) + (lngopt   ln  g) + (uopt    u)]
 c
  1; = 0:COMPANION APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 50
Welfare costs of business cycles





Let us start by dening the variables in log-deviations from the steady-state:
~ ct = log(ct
 c ) ct =  cexp(~ ct)
~ gt = log(
gt
 g ) gt =  g exp(~ gt)
~ ut = log(ut
 u ) ut =  uexp(~ ut):
If we do a second-order approximation to the variables around the steady state f c;  g;  ug:
ct =  c(1 + ~ ct + 1
2~ c2
t) + o(3);
gt =  g(1 + ~ gt + 1
2~ g2
t) + o(3);
ut =  u(1 + ~ ut + 1
2~ u2
t) + o(3):
The second-order approximation of the utility function gives:
U(ct;gt;ut) = U( c;  g;  u) + Uc( c;  g;  u)[ct    c] + Ug( c;  g;  u)[gt    g] + Uu( c;  g;  u)[ut    u] +
1
2








Uuu( c;  g;  u)[ut    u]
2 +
Ucg( c;  g;  u)[ct    c][gt    g] + Ucu( c;  g;  u)[ct    c][ut    u] + Ugu( c;  g;  u)[gt    g][ut    u] + o(3):
But for it to be correct, we have to plug in the second-order approximation of the variables.
Given the additive separability of the utility functions, we can drop the cross-terms between
the consumption goods and unemployment.























































Collecting terms and substituting the derivatives,
U(ct;gt;ut) = U( c;  g;  u) + uc c~ ct + ug g~ gt + u u~ ut +
 c
2










( uuu + u)~ u
2
t + ucg( c;  g) c g~ ct~ gt + o(3):
Taking the unconditional expectation, we can write the welfare cost in terms of the moments
of the variables:
E[u(ct;gt) + (ut)   u( c;  g)   ( u)]  uc cE[~ ct] + ug gE[~ gt] + u uE[~ ut] +
 c
2










( uuu + u)E[~ u
2
t] + ucg( c;  g) c gE[~ ct~ gt]  :
I solve the model up to a second-order using perturbation methods and compute the moments
of the variables to nd the value of . To express the welfare costs as a percentage of steady-COMPANION APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 51
state consumption, we solve the following equation:
u((1   x) c;  g)   u( c;  g) = :
For the CES function, the derivatives are given by:
uc( c;  g) =
 c 1
 c +  g;
ug( c;  g) =
 g 1
 c +  g;
ucc( c;  g) =
(   1) c 2
 c +  g  
 c2 2
( c +  g)2;
ugg( c;  g) =
(   1) g 2
 c +  g  
2 g2 2
( c +  g)2;
ucg( c;  g) =
  g 1 c 1
( c +  g)2 ;
u( u) = ;
uu( u) = 0:
And the expression for the welfare cost is:
x = 1  





If  = 0 the solution is given by:
x = 1  






















t+k+1   (1   
p)l
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uc(ct;gt) = ug(ct;gt): (26)COMPANION APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 52
Appendix V - Bayesian estimation
Model - All equations





t + ut; (A1)
l
p














































































I dene a variable xi
t as the dierence between the value of working and being unemployed.




























































t) = btJt: (A16)



































t) = ln( v













t) = ln(  w











I include 6 dierent shocks: a shock to government vacancies, to government wages, to private
and public separation rates, private sector bargaining power and to technology. These shocks
are described by the following equations:
ln(a
p
t) = ln( a
p) + (ln(l
g


















































ln(bt) = (1   
b)ln( b) + 
b ln(bt 1) + 
b
t: (A28)COMPANION APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 54

























Model - Steady State
I set the steady-state government employment at  lg. As there is no recursive way to write
the steady-state variables, they solve the following non-linear system of equations:
 l
p = 1    l

























































p s =  m
g x
g(1    s);
(1   b)( x
p) = b  J;
 J =
 ap    wp
1   (1   p)
;
&p
 qp(1   (1   
p)) = ( a
p    w
p);
 w
g =   w
p;
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uc( c;  g) =
 c 1
 c +  g;
u = ;
 f =




p lp + g lg
 lp +  lg :
Estimated log-linearized model
The variables with tilde are expressed in deviations from steady-state.
0 =  l
p~ l
p
t +  l
g~ l
g
t +  u~ ut; (L1)
~ l
p
t+1 = (1    
p)~ l
p
t    
p~ 
p






t+1 = (1    
g)~ l
g
t    
g~ 
g









1    s













t = ~ m
p









1    s
~ st   ~ ut; (L7)
~ p
g
t = ~ m
g
t   ~ st   ~ ut; (L8)
~ uc(~ ct; ~ gt) = ~ ct(   1  
 c
 c +  g)   ~ gt(
 g
 c +  g); (L9)
~ u(~ ut) = 0; (L10)










(~ u   ~ uc)   ( 
p~ 
p
t +  p
p~ p
p
t) + (1    
p    p
p)Et(~ x
p










(~ u   ~ uc)   ( 
g~ 
g
t +  p
g~ p
g
t) + (1    
g    p
g)Et(~ x
g











t + Et((1    
p)~ t + (1    




To test the relevance of the directed search assumption, I have added the parameter  to
the log-linearized equation that determines ~ st
~ st = (1    s)Et(~ x
g
t+1   ~ x
p
t+1   ~ m
p





































 qp ~ q
p
t = [ a
p~ a
p
t+1    w
p ~ w
p
t+1   (1    
p)
&p
 qp ~ q
p





t + ( a
p    w
p + (1    
p)
&p
 qp)~ t]; (L19)
~ v
g
t =  
v ~ v
p
t + ~ v
p
t 1 + ~ v
p
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w ~ w
p
t + ~ w
p
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~ bt = 
b~ bt 1 + 
b
t; (L28)
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~ t = (~ 
p




 p lp +  g lg + (~ 
g




 p lp +  g lg + ~ ut
 u
1   ~ u
: (L30)
Definition of observable variables
Dierences Levels 2
6 6




















t   ~ l
g
t 1
~ ut   ~ ut 1
~ w
g
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Model with random search
Equation A1-A3, A6 and A9-A11 are the same. As there is no directed search, we drop












































































For the log-linearized model the expressions are:
~ m
p
t   ~ m
g
t = ~ v
p





t   ~ v
p
t = 
p~ ut   
p(
 mp
















(~ u   ~ uc)   ( 
p~ 
p
t +  p
p~ p
p
t) + (1    
p    p
p)Et(~ x
p
t+1 + ~ 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Estimation results (levels)
Table A3: Prior and posterior distribution of structural parameters




Elasticity of substitution (public and private goods)  Normal (0, 0.1) 0.123 (-0.034, 0.282)
Utility of unemployment  Normal (0.5, 0.1) 0.333 (0.197, 0.472)
Separation rate (private sector) p Normal (0.06, 0.01) 0.035 (0.028, 0.042)
Separation rate (public sector) g Normal (0.03, 0.01) 0.030 (0.018, 0.041)
Cost of posting vacancy (private sector) &p Normal (2, 0.3) 0.561 (0.335, 0.777)
Cost of posting vacancy (public sector) &g Normal (1.1, 0.2) 1.191 (0.908, 1.488)
Vacancy lling probability (private sector)  qp Normal (3.9, 0.2) 3.982 (3.617, 4.339)
Vacancy lling probability (public sector)  qg Normal (2.5, 0.2) 2.484 (2.130, 2.834)
Matching elasticity w.r.t unemployment (private) p Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.801 (0.731, 0.870)
Matching elasticity w.r.t unemployment (public) g Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.238 (0.123, 0.353)
Bargaining power b Beta (0.5, 0.10) 0.820 (0.773, 0.871)
Public sector wage premium  Normal (1.02, 0.01) 1.023 (1.011, 1.035)
Productivity of public employment  Normal (0, 0.1) 0.137 (0.037, 0.235)
Business cycle response of public sector wages  w Normal (0, 0.3) 0.365 (0.088, 0.632)
Business cycle response of public sector vacancies  v Normal (0, 0.3) -0.395 (-0.601, -0.172)
Importance of directed search  Normal (0, 0.3) 0.450 (0.327, 0.579)
Autoregressive parameters
Productivity a Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.987 (0.980, 0.995)
Public sector wage w Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.978 (0.964, 0.992)
Public sector vacancies v Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.919 (0.859, 0.979)
Private sector separation rate lp Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.978 (0.966, 0.990)
Public sector separation rate lg Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.211 (0.103, 0.313)
Bargaining power b Beta (0.5, 0.15) 0.906 (0.863, 0.953)
Standard deviations
Productivity a IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.008 (0.007, 0.009)
Public sector wage w IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.011 (0.010, 0.012)
Public sector vacancies v IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.086 (0.040, 0.132)
Private sector separation rate lp IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.132 (0.102, 0.162)
Public sector separation rate lg IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.155 (0.091, 0.220)
Bargaining power b IGamma (0.01, 0.15) 0.020 (0.012, 0.028)
Table A4: Model Comparison (Levels)










Density (ve;vd) (( v
u)e;( v
u)d)
Directed search 4381.7 2.39 0.40 0.94 0.58
Directed search ( = 0) 4357.2 0.97 0.59 1.15 0.73
Random search 4345.0 0.71 0.50 0.76 0.71COMPANION APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 59
Subsample estimation results
































































































































Note: Solid line is the estimation in dierences and the dash line the estimation in levels.